

Theory Of Incentives In Procurement And Regulation

Yeah, reviewing a books **Theory Of Incentives In Procurement And Regulation** could ensue your close connections listings. This is just one of the solutions for you to be successful. As understood, feat does not suggest that you have extraordinary points.

Comprehending as competently as conformity even more than other will pay for each success. adjacent to, the proclamation as competently as keenness of this Theory Of Incentives In Procurement And Regulation can be taken as without difficulty as picked to act.

Regulatory Reform - Mark Armstrong 1994
Tackles the important issue of how to regulate firms with market power.

Lectures on Antitrust Economics - Michael Dennis Whinston 2006
Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that

vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

Economics Does Not Lie - Guy Sorman 2011-02
In 2005, *The Woman at the Washington Zoo* was published to major critical acclaim. The late Marjorie Williams possessed "a special voice, one capable not just of canny political observations but of tenderness and bracing intimacy," observed the New York Times Book Review. Now, in a collection of profiles with the richness of short fiction, Williams limns the personalities that dominated politics and the media during the final years of the twentieth century. In these pages, Clark Clifford grieves "in his laborious baritone" a bank scandal's blow to his re-pu-taaaaaay-shun. Lee Atwater likens himself to Ulysses and pleads, "tah me to the mast!" Patricia Duff sheds "precipitous tears" over her divorce from Ronald Perelman, resembling afterwards "a garden refreshed by spring rain." Reputation illuminates our recent past through expertly drawn portraits of powerful - and messily human - figures.
The Regulation of Entry - 2001

Competition Policy - Massimo Motta
2004-01-12

This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or

competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal with such important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices, and price discrimination, and to formulate policy implications on these issues. The interaction between theory and practice is one of the main features of the book, which contains frequent references to competition policy cases and a few fully developed case studies. The treatment is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and some solved problems are provided.

The Economics of Regulation - Alfred E. Kahn
1988-06-22

As Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the late 1970s, Alfred E. Kahn presided over the deregulation of the airlines and his book, published earlier in that decade, presented the first comprehensive integration of the economic theory and institutional practice of economic regulation. In his lengthy new introduction to this edition Kahn surveys and analyzes the deregulation revolution that has not only swept the airlines but has transformed American public utilities and private industries generally over the past seventeen years. While attitudes toward regulation have changed several times in the intervening years and government regulation has waxed and waned, the question of whether to regulate more or to regulate less is a topic of constant debate, one that *The Economics of Regulation* addresses incisively. It clearly remains the standard work in the field, a starting point and reference tool for anyone working in regulation. Kahn points out that while dramatic changes have come about in the structurally competitive industries - the airlines, trucking, stock exchange brokerage services, railroads, buses, cable television, oil and natural gas - the consensus about the desirability and necessity for regulated monopoly in public utilities has likewise been dissolving, under the burdens of inflation, fuel crises, and the traumatic experience with nuclear plants. Kahn

reviews and assesses the changes in both areas: he is particularly frank in his appraisal of the effect of deregulation on the airlines. His conclusion today mirrors that of his original, seminal work - that different industries need different mixes of institutional arrangements that cannot be decided on the basis of ideology.

Incentives and Political Economy - Jean-Jacques Laffont 2000-03-30

Mainstream economics has only recently recognized the need to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. "Incentives and Political Economy" uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments. It is written by one of Europe's leading theorists. The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed. The second part of the book recognizes the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves a lot of discretion to the politicians selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitution weighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas. The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterize the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institutions in which group behavior is important.

Scarcity, Conflicts, and Cooperation - Pranab Bardhan 2004-11-05

This wide-ranging review of some of the major issues in development economics focuses on the role of economic and political institutions. Drawing on the latest findings in institutional economics and political economy, Pranab Bardhan, a leader in the field of development economics, offers a relatively nontechnical discussion of current thinking on these issues from the viewpoint of poor countries, synthesizing recent research and reflecting on where we stand today. The institutional framework of an economy defines and constrains the opportunities of individuals, determines the business climate, and shapes the incentives and organizations for collective action on the part of communities; Pranab Bardhan finds the institutional framework to be relatively weak in many poor countries. Institutional failures, weak accountability mechanisms, and missed opportunities for cooperative problem-solving become the themes of the book, with the role of distributive conflicts in the persistence of dysfunctional institutions as a common thread. Special issues taken up include the institutions for securing property rights and resolving coordination failures; the structural basis of power; commitment devices and political accountability; the complex relationship between democracy and poverty (with examples from India, where both have been durable); decentralization and devolution of power; persistence of corruption; ethnic conflicts; and impediments to collective action. Formal models are largely avoided, except in two chapters where Bardhan briefly introduces new models to elucidate currently under-researched areas. Other chapters review existing models, emphasizing the essential ideas rather than the formal details. Thus the book will be valuable not only for economists but also for social scientists and policymakers.

Regulating Business by Independent

Commission - Marver H. Bernstein 2015-12-08

A critical examination of the role of the independent regulatory commissions, attempting to develop a more realistic concept of the process of governmental regulation and to appraise the independent commission as an agent of governmental regulation at the national level. Originally published in 1955. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-

on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Preventing Regulatory Capture - Daniel Carpenter 2014

Leading scholars from across the social sciences present empirical evidence that the obstacle of regulatory capture is more surmountable than previously thought.

The Theory of Industrial Organization - Jean Tirole 1988-08-26

The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises.

Downloaded from
omahafoodtruckassociation.org on by
guest

Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition.

[A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation](#) - Jean-Jacques Laffont 1993

Based on their work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach to this field, focusing on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies and transportation authorities.

The Economics of Contracts - Eric Brousseau 2002-10-17

A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this 2002 book provides an overview of developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners.

The Theory of Corporate Finance - Jean Tirole 2010-08-26

The past twenty years have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations--equity, debt, and valuation--today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading

economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, *The Theory of Corporate Finance* is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, *The Theory of Corporate Finance* will be the authoritative text for years to come.

Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation - William Paul Rogerson 1992

The defense sector is subject to a form of cost-based economic regulation, just as public utilities are. A set of regulations determines the price that defense contractors will receive for their products. This report describes and empirically investigates an extremely simple theory that captures an important aspect of the regulatory problem in defense contracting. The theory describes a critical difference between the regulatory problems in defense and public utilities and suggests why therefore different rules and institutions might be appropriate in each case. It also identifies several implications regarding the structuring of an optimal regulatory policy and sheds light on current policy debates over Department of Defense policy. The author empirically verifies that the incentives posited by the theory exist and are large. The theory is that profit regulation of defense contractors is structured (and

necessarily must be structured) so that firms generating valuable new innovations will receive large rewards or prizes. The author attempts to establish the theoretical link between prizes and innovation and then to show that price levels induced by the current rules are large enough to make a theoretical analysis of the role of these prizes important.

[OECD Principles for Integrity in Public Procurement](#) - OECD 2009-03-24

The OECD Principles for Integrity in Public Procurement are a ground-breaking instrument that promotes good governance in the entire procurement cycle, from needs assessment to contract management.

Regulation and Development - Jean-Jacques Laffont 2005-03-10

Jean-Jacques Laffont provides the first theoretical analysis of regulation of public services for less developed countries (LDC's). He shows how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost of service regulation is affected by the characteristics of LDCs, develops a new theory of regulation with limited enforcement capabilities, and discusses the delicate issue of access pricing in view of LDC's specificities. Based on organization theory and history, and using empirical tests where possible, Laffont's evaluation of the different ways to organize the regulatory institutions makes a significant contribution to the field.

[Handbook of Procurement](#) - Nicola Dimitri 2006-09-28

How can organizations ensure that they can get best value for money in their procurement decisions? How can they stimulate innovations from their dedicated suppliers? With contributions from leading academics and professionals, this 2006 handbook offers expert guidance on the fundamental aspects of successful procurement design and management in firms, public administrations, and international institutions. The issues addressed include the management of dynamic procurement; the handling of procurement risk; the architecture of purchasing systems; the structure of incentives in procurement contracts; methods to increase suppliers' participation in procurement contests and e-procurement platforms; how to minimize the risk of collusion and of corruption; pricing and reputation

mechanisms in e-procurement platforms; and how procurement can enhance innovation. Inspired by frontier research, it provides practical recommendations to managers, engineers and lawyers engaged in private and public procurement design.

The Principal Agent Model - Jean-Jacques Laffont 2003

Incentive theory has been a major development in economics and the principal-agent model is the core of this theory. This authoritative collection brings together the essential literature concerning the principal-agent model when no restrictions on the design of the principal's contract exist in terms of complexity, enforcement and rationality. historical formulation of the problem to the first attempts to formalize it. Part two deals with the case of moral hazard and adverse selection is the topic of Part three. Part four presents contributions on current research issues such as the impact of communication constraints, endogenous information structures and multidimensional incentive problems.

[Competition in Telecommunications](#) - Jean-Jacques Laffont 2001

In *Competition in Telecommunications*, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole analyze regulatory reform and the emergence of competition in network industries using the state-of-the-art theoretical tools of industrial organization, political economy, and the economics of incentives. The book opens with background information for the reader who is unfamiliar with current issues in the telecommunications industry. The following sections focus on four central aspects of the recent deregulatory movement: the introduction of incentive regulation; one-way access; the special nature of competition in an industry requiring two-way access; and universal service, in particular, the use of engineering models to compute subsidies and the design of universal service auctions.

The Prudential Regulation of Banks - Mathias Dewatripont 1994-12-01

The *Prudential Regulation of Banks* applies modern economic theory to prudential regulation of financial intermediaries. Dewatripont and Tirole tackle the key problem of providing the right incentives to management

in banks by looking at how external intervention by claimholders (holders of equity or debt) affects managerial incentives and how that intervention might ideally be implemented. Their primary focus is the regulation of commercial banks and S&Ls, but many of the implications of their theory are also valid for other intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension funds, and securities funds. Observing that the main concern of the regulation of intermediaries is solvency (the relation between equity, debt, and asset riskiness), the authors provide institutional background and develop a case for regulation as performing the monitoring functions (screening, auditing, covenant writing, and intervention) that dispersed depositors are unable or unwilling to perform. They also illustrate the dangers of regulatory failure in a summary of the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Following a survey of banking theory, Dewatripont and Tirole develop their model of the capital structure of banks and show how optimal regulation can be achieved using capital adequacy requirements and external intervention when banks are violated. They explain how regulation can be designed to minimize risks of accounting manipulations and to insulate bank managers from macroeconomic shocks, which are beyond their control. Finally, they provide a detailed evaluation of the existing regulation and of potential alternatives, such as rating agencies, private deposit insurance, and large private depositors. They show that these reforms are, at best, a complement, rather than a substitute, to the existing regulation which combines capital ratios with external intervention in case of insolvency. The Prudential Regulation of Banks is part of the Walras Pareto Lectures, from the University of Lausanne.

Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities -

Michael A. Crew 1994-09-30

This book is based on two seminars held at Rutgers on October 22, 1993, and May 6, 1994 entitled 'Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities'. These contributions by leading scholars and practitioners represent some of the best new research in public utility economics and include topics such as the theory of incentive regulation, dynamic pricing, transfer pricing, issues in law and economics, pricing priority service, and energy utility resource

planning.

Renewable Energy Tariffs and Incentives in Indonesia - Asian Development Bank 2020-09-01

This report proposes a renewable energy subsidy mechanism for Indonesia to close the gap between the costs of renewable and conventional power generation. It takes into account the additional economic benefits of renewable power and considers how the government can support its rapid deployment in the power sector. The report emphasizes the need for Indonesia to adopt international best practice for planning, procurement, contracting, and risk mitigation to reduce the financial costs of renewable energy development. To achieve this, implementation of the subsidy should be part of a broader inter-ministerial electricity policy reform program.

Price Setting and Price Regulation in Health Care - OECD 2019-06-26

The objectives of this study are to describe experiences in price setting and how pricing has been used to attain better coverage, quality, financial protection, and health outcomes. It builds on newly commissioned case studies and lessons learned in calculating prices, negotiating with providers, and monitoring changes.

Recognising that no single model is applicable to all settings, the study aimed to generate best practices and identify areas for future research, particularly in low- and middle-income settings. The report and the case studies were jointly developed by the OECD and the WHO Centre for Health Development in Kobe (Japan).

Putting Auction Theory to Work - Paul Milgrom 2004-01-12

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the

tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships - Stéphane Saussier 2018-01-03

This book investigates the economic decisions behind the implementation of public-private partnerships (PPPs). The first part of the book discusses different forms of public procurement contracts, in particular in France and the UK, and provides an economic analysis of the potential advantages and pitfalls of public-private partnerships. This exploration of PPPs' efficiency also includes an examination of the financing conditions of public procurements, as well as regulatory requirements. By reviewing empirical studies on PPPs, the second part of the book compares their advantages over purely public solutions and offers practical guidance on their implementation. Practitioners will also learn best practices on how to involve stakeholders in calls for bids.

Public Procurement Regulation in Africa - Sue Arrowsmith 2013-01-17

This book examines the regulatory rules on public procurement in selected African countries and provides a comparative analysis of key regulatory issues.

Regional Public Goods - Antoni Esteveordal 2004

Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities - Michael A. Crew 2012-12-06

This book is based on two seminars held at Rutgers on October 22, 1993, and May 6, 1994 entitled 'Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities'. These contributions by leading scholars and practitioners represent some of the best new research in public utility economics and include topics such as the theory of incentive regulation, dynamic pricing, transfer pricing, issues in law and economics, pricing priority service, and energy utility resource planning.

The Theory of Competitive Price - George Joseph Stigler 1946

Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions - J. Luis Guasch 2004-01-01

During the 1990s, infrastructure concessions were hailed as the solution to Latin America's endemic infrastructure deficit, by combining private sector efficiency with rent dissipation brought about by competition. This publication examines the design and implementation of over 1,000 examples of concession contracts, in order to identify the problems that have occurred in the process. It goes on to highlight lessons to be learned for the future, in order to realise the potential benefits of infrastructure reform and to contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction.

The Theory of Incentives - Jean-Jacques Laffont 2009-12-27

Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor

Downloaded from
omahafoodtruckassociation.org on by
guest

economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

The Economic and Labour Relations Review
- 2007

Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System - Jean Tirole 2002-07-21

Tirole analyzes the current views on financial crises and on the reform of the international financial architecture. Based on the Paolo Baffi Lecture the author delivered at the Bank of Italy, this refreshingly accessible book is teeming with rich insights that researchers, policy makers, and students at all levels will find indispensable.

Incentives In Procurement Contracting - Jim Leitzel 1993-03-18

This volume presents a nontechnical treatment of issues that arise in procurement contracting, with an emphasis on major weapons systems procurement. Employing the economic theory of agency as their analytical framework, contributors assess the incentives that arise, for both buyers and sellers, in different contractual settings. Procurement contracting can become problematic when either the buyer or the seller has privileged information. The production costs of a project, for example, may be known to the seller but unknown to the buyer. Another potential difficulty can occur if the quality of a project cannot be verified to third parties, such as courts (even if both the buyer and seller can accurately judge the quality); contracts that are contingent upon quality will generally not be enforceable. Also, the typical defense procurement buyer is usually a hierarchy rather than a single agent. Different levels in the hierarchy may have different preferences, so strategic behavior can arise on the buying side viewed in isolation. Or collusive behavior between the seller and one level of the buying hierarchy can arise, again fostered by private information and differing preferences. This book offers a lucid account of the problems - such as high cost and low quality - that can plague major weapons systems procurement. Together, the chapters provide improved understanding of agency theory in general and expert insight into weapons procurement in particular.

The Economics of the European Patent System - Dominique Guellec 2007-02

Why does society allow, or even encourage, private appropriation of inventions? When do patents encourage competition, when do they hamper it? These questions and many more are addressed by two eminent scholars in this groundbreaking analysis of the economic foundations of the European patent system.

Public Technology Procurement and Innovation - Charles Edquist 2012-12-06

Public Technology Procurement and Innovation studies public technology procurement as an instrument of innovation policy. In the past few years, public technology procurement has been a relatively neglected topic in the theoretical and research literature on the economics of innovation. Similarly, preoccupation with 'supply-side' measures has led policy-makers to avoid making very extensive use of this important 'demand-side' instrument. These trends have been especially pronounced in the European Union. There, as this book will argue, existing legislation governing public procurement presents obstacles to the use of public technology procurement as a means of stimulating and supporting technological innovation. Recently, however, there has been a gradual re-awakening of practical interest in such measures among policy-makers in the EU and elsewhere. For these and other related measures, this volume aims to contribute to a serious reconsideration of public technology procurement from the complementary standpoints of innovation theory and innovation policy.

Demand-side Innovation Policies - OECD 2011-05-17

This book examines dynamics between demand and innovation and provides insights into the rationale and scope for public policies to foster demand for innovation.

The Economics of Contract Choice - Yūjirō Hayami 1993

This work examines the nature of agrarian contracts. Agricultural land tenancy and farm labor are basic institutions binding the life and work of billions of people in the Third World. Issues of efficiency and equity associated with a particular form of contract--such as sharecropping--are not merely of academic

interest, but have critical bearing on land tenure reform as well as innovations in credit and marketing institutions in agrarian economies. There have been major controversies surrounding the role of land tenure in agricultural and rural development, with much confusion arising from only partial and separate treatments of land and labor contracts. Through a comprehensive critical survey of existing literature, Hayami and Otsuka present a general theory of agrarian contracts by integrating land

and labor contracts. Insights from the scrutiny of agrarian contracts are of relevance to industrial organization and management in developed economies as well as to the study of these fields.

The Economics of Contracts - Bernard Salanié
2005-03-11

A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.